We consider a market for vertically di¤erentiated goods where …rms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterised by di¤erent quality levels. We show that the adoption of a patent system limiting the quality range avalable to later entrants is socially undesirable, in that it builds a barrier to entry to the advantage of the …rst innovator.
Introduction
An apparently well established result in the theory of vertically di¤eren-tiated oligopoly states that earlier entrants supply goods of higher quality than later entrants, in that the high-quality products earn higher pro…ts than low-quality alternatives (see, inter alia, Thisse, 1979, 1980; Sutton, 1982, 1983; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1995) . A general proof of this result for every convex …xed-cost function of quality improvement is provided by Lehmann-Grube (1997). 1 In this literature, quality is thought of as being the result of …rms' R&D activity, although this aspect is not explicitly tackled. This is done instead in a few recent papers where …rms' e¤orts in developing quality is described in details (Dutta et al., 1995; Rosenkranz, 1995; van Dijk, 1996) . In particular, van Dijk (1996) investigates the design of patent height in a duopoly model where quality and time are measured along the same dimension. 2 This accounts for the idea that quality improvements take time. Adopting a model where the market is only partially served under monopoly and fully served under duopoly, van Dijk considers a patent system establishing that later innovators can enter the market if and only if they supply su¢cient quality improvements as compared to incumbents (i.e., earlier innovators). van Dijk proves that the patent system does not a¤ect the evolution of market structure as compared to the situation without patents. Moreover, he shows that later entrants may gain by producing goods whose quality is higher than the …rst innovator's. This result is due to the fact that it is more pro…table to be the improver rather than the original innovator, in line with well known …ndings by previous research in the …eld of vertical di¤erentiation.
We investigate a model of vertical di¤erentiation where (i) partial market coverage emerges at equilibrium independently of the number of …rms; (ii) time and quality are separate dimensions; and (iii) costs are convex in quality. Hypotheses (ii) and (iii) amount to assuming that the development of superior quality levels is not necessarily correlated with the time span over 1 Aoki and Prusa (1997) adopt a speci…c case of the cost function analysed by LehmannGrube, to investigate the consequences on pro…ts, consumer surplus and social welfare of the timing of investment in product quality in a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly where the market stage is played in the price space. See also Lambertini (1999). 2 The optimal design of patents in terms of their breadth and length, and imitations alongside the patent, are analysed in several contributions (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990; Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Gallini, 1992; Denicolò, 1996) . which R&D activity is carried out, and we allow for the choice of quality to be dictated by strategic incentives alone. That is, we take the view that a later entrant may supply lower quality product than the incumbent's, if it is pro…table to do so. The time horizon is in…nite, and two …rms may enter the market at di¤erent dates, which are exogenously …xed. Under speci…c assumptions, we prove that it is convenient for the later entrant to produce a lower quality than the …rst innovator's, for the following reason. If the later innovator enters with a quality lower than the …rst innovator, both …rms' pro…ts are positive. Otherwise, when the second innovator enters with a higher quality, her pro…ts are nil due to the fact that the incumbent …nds it optimal to produce a limit quality, larger than the optimal monopoly quality, such that entry is blockaded and the …rst innovator remains a monopolist. In contrast with van Dijk's …ndings, this result allows us to conclude that a patent system requiring any given improvement on the incumbent's quality is socially undesirable, in that it produces an everlasting monopoly. The same holds for a patent system covering a subset of the product range below the incumbent's quality, if the extent of the patent's height is larger than a critical threshold.
Several real-world examples can be found to match with our theoretical setting. For instance, consider the evolution of the market for CD players (CDPs). Early innovators, Philips and Sony, …rst introduced top-notch CDPs in 1982. The di¤usion of low-priced CDPs started in the late '80s, with the same brands as well as several others. The same holds for the adoption of kevlar in the manufacturing of loudspeaker cones, originally introduced by Bowers & Wilkins in expensive loudspeaker systems, and subsequently adopted by B&W and many other manufacturers in more popular products.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model of vertical di¤erentiation is laid out in section 2. Section 3 describes the two alternative entry games, where (i) the …rst entrant produces a high-quality good while the second entrant produces a low-quality good; and (ii) the opposite situation where the second entrant sells a good of higher quality than the incumbent's. Section 4 contains the evaluation of the e¤ects of patents on market structure, assessing their social desirability. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks.
The model
Consider the following full-information setting. Let a market for vertically di¤erentiated products exist over t 2 [0; 1): Two single-product …rms, labelled as 1 and 2, produce goods of di¤erent qualities, q 1 and q 2 2 [0; 1), through the same technology, C i (q k ) = cq 2 k ; with k = H; L and i = 1; 2: Development costs C i (q k ) are evaluated at the time t i when …rm i enters the market. 3 As usual, these costs can be interpreted as …xed costs due to the R&D e¤ort needed to produce a certain quality, while variable production costs are negligible. Hence, without further loss of generality, we assume them to be nil. We characterize the technology represented by the above cost function as follows:
Then she can supply the market with any quality q 2 (0; b q) without any additional costs. Once into the market, the …rm cannot invest any more resources in R&D.
The above amounts to assuming that any change in the quality level implies adjustment costs if and only if the change takes the form of a quality increase. 4 Conversely, once …rm i has borne the cost of developing a given quality, she may decide to decrease the quality of her product costlessly. For later reference, we de…ne [0; b q] as the quality production set of the …rm. As to the design of the patent system, we can outline three alternative situations, analogous to some of those discussed in van Dijk (1996, pp. One could assume that adjustment costs be su¢ciently large to make it unpro…table for …rms to modify quality after the initial development phase. However, under full information, any such behaviour would clearly be irrational. Therefore, adjustment costs can be expected not to be borne by either …rm at equilibrium. " > 0: Then, the second innovator must produce e q > b q + " in order not to infringe the patent over the …rst innovation.
Patent System 3 The patent's length is in…nite. If the …rst innovator develops quality b q; then the patent covers the interval [b q ¡ "; b q] ; with " > 0: Then, the second innovator must produce e q < b q ¡ " or e q > b q in order not to infringe the patent over the …rst innovation.
Observe that patent system 2 imposes a minimum quality improvement "; arbitrarily large, on the part of the second entrant. That is, the protection ensured by the patent to the incumbent is strictly larger than the incumbent's quality production set, [0; b q]. Patent system 3 covers a proper subset of the incumbent's quality production set. A fourth patent system would be one that covers only b q: This is immediately ruled out as it is obvious that the incentive toward product di¤erentiation su¢ces to guarantee that later entrants would never produce b q: Products are o¤ered on a market where consumers have unit demands, and buy if and only if the net surplus derived from consumption
; where p i (q k ) is the unit price charged by …rm i on a good of quality q k , purchased by a generic consumer whose marginal willingness to pay is µ 2 [0; µ]: We assume that µ is uniformly distributed with density one over such interval, so that the total mass of consumer is µ. Assuming that the lower bound to µ is zero implies that, throughout the following analysis, we will consider partial market coverage only.
Firms' entry dates are exogenous. Firm 1 enters at date t 1¸0 ; in the remainder, we shall label the …rst entrant as the leader. Firm 2 enters at date t 2 2 [t 1 ; 1); and we shall refer to her as the follower. However, we do not assume that quality level and entry time are positively related. A …rm might enter the market early with a high quality or late with a low quality, depending upon strategic incentives. Over the time span [t 1 ; t 2 ); the leader remains a monopolist. At any t 2 [t 1 ; t 2 ); …rm 1 maximizes w.r.t. price the instantaneous revenues:
where p M is monopoly price and x M = µ ¡ p M =q M is market demand. We can prove the following:
Lemma 1 The leader's revenues during the monopoly phase are everywhere increasing in quality.
Proof. The …rst order condition (FOC) of the monopolist w.r.t. p M is:
yielding p M = µq M =2 as the optimal monopoly price, so that (1) simpli…es to:
which is everywhere increasing in q M .
Concerning …rms' behavior after the follower's entry, we are going to examine two alternative perspectives:
A. The follower enters at t 2 with a product whose quality is lower than the leader's. We label this case as high-quality leadership.
B. The follower enters at t 2 with a product whose quality is higher than the leader's. We label this case as low-quality leadership.
In both cases, over t 2 [t 2 ; 1); …rms compete in prices. The solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction. 5 We borrow from Aoki and Prusa (1997) and Lehmann-Grube (1997) the assumption that downstream Bertrand competition is simultaneous. Market demands for the high-and low-quality good are, respectively:
In particular, we solve both stages in the duopoly regime through a simultaneous Nash equilibrium. This simpli…es calculations withouth signi…cantly a¤ecting the main results.
Duopoly revenue functions are
Solving for the price equilibrium, the revenue function of …rm 1 can be rewritten in terms of qualities only, as follows:
Per-period revenues accruing to the follower are de…ned residually. On the basis of expressions (6-7), previous literature, dealing with single-period models, established that the …rst entrant would choose to supply the high-quality good.
The entry games
Here, we brie ‡y expose the outcomes of the two entry games, in order to outline …rms' pro…t incentives which are going to shape the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model.
High-quality leadership
We …rst consider case A, where under monopoly (t 2 [t 1 ; t 2 )) the …rst entrant (…rm 1) supplies quality q M ; while in the duopoly regime (t 2 [t 2 ; 1)) the …rst entrant produces q H¸qM and the second entrant (…rm 2) produces q L · q H : Hence, the development cost born by …rm 1 is that associated with q H ; i.e., C 1 (q H ); whose present value is cq 2 H ¢ e ¡rt 1 : The discounted ‡ow of pro…ts accruing to …rm 1 is:
while the discounted pro…ts to …rm 2 are:
The proof is omitted here, as it is provided by several authors (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Choi and Shin, 1992; Motta, 1993; Aoki and Prusa, 1997; Lehmann-Grube, 1997).
Instantaneous revenues R M ; R H and R L are given by (3), (6) and (7), respectively. Firms non-cooperatively maximize discounted intertemporal pro…ts w.r.t. qualities. The outcome of this game is summarized by the following:
Proposition 1 When the leader produces a higher quality than the rival, both …rms enjoy positive pro…ts, with ¦ 1H > ¦ 2L > 0: Hence, over t 2 [t 2 ; 1) the market is a duopoly.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Low-quality leadership
Consider now the alternative case where, under duopoly, the leader (…rm 1) produces q L · q M ; while the follower (…rm 2) produces q H¸qM¸qL : The discounted ‡ow of pro…ts accruing to …rm 1 is:
The outcome of this game is summarized by:
Proposition 2 When the leader produces a lower quality than the rival, ¦ 1L > 0 and ¦ 2H = 0: As a result, the incumbent remains a monopolist forever.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
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It might happen that q M < q L (see appendix A2). In general, the cost function of the leader would write C 1 (max fq L ; q M g) : This would not in ‡uence the main result we derive in this section. Moreover, as the ad interim monopoly revenues are everywhere increasing in q M ; it appears reasonable to consider the situation where the lead time be exploited as much as possible by the …rst entrant. This coincides with the view taken by van Dijk (1996, p. 156).
Evaluation of patent systems
An intermediate step towards the design of the patent system consists in assessing …rms' preferences as to their respective locations along the quality spectrum, based upon their pure pro…t incentives, i.e., independently of exogenous conditions imposed by a patent system.
Consider the perspective facing the …rst …rm to innovate. The leader's decision as to whether to supply a low or a high-quality good depends on the comparative evaluation of the following pro…t ‡ows:
If ¦ 1H (x; º; ³) > ¦ 1L (º; ³); then it is pro…table to supply the high-quality good, and conversely if ¦ 1H (x; º; ³) < ¦ 1L (º; ³): Hence, we have to evaluate the following expression:
It is immediate that (14) is positive if µ is su¢ciently large, i.e., if the market is su¢ciently rich. However, we are also interested in evaluating (14) in terms of the time span separating entries by the two …rms, that is, the length of the period t 2 ¡ t 1 wherein …rm 1 remains a monopolist. To this aim, it is convenient to use the expression in (22) and the de…nition º = ¹=´, so as to rewrite both ¦ 1L (º; ³) and ¦ 1H (x; º; ³) in terms of ¹ and´only, and to set µ = 1. Under all practical respects, this re-parameterization permits to evaluate the pro…t perspectives of …rm 1 in terms of t 1 and t 2 ; in that ¹ = e ¡rt 1 and´= e ¡rt 2 : The problem reduces to evaluating ¦ 1L (¹;´) ¡ ¦ 1H (¹;´) in the admissible parameter range ¹ >´. The implicit plot of ¦ 1L (¹;´) ¡ ¦ 1H (¹;´) = 0 in the space f¹;´g is in …gure 1.
The thick curve denotes a solution´(¹) to ¦ 1L (¹;´) ¡ ¦ 1H (¹;´) = 0: Together with´= ¹;´(¹) allows us to partition the parameter space into three regions.
² Region I is not admissible, in that it must be ¹ = e ¡rt 1 >´= e ¡rt 2 :
² In region II, ¦ 1L (¹;´) < ¦ 1H (¹;´) in that t 2 is relatively close to t 1 :
The time span over which the leader remains a monopolist is too short to justify entering with a low quality good.
The entry date of the follower is far enough in the future to make it more pro…table entering with a low-quality good.
The above taxonomy highlights that there exists a trade-o¤ between enjoying monopoly power as long as possible and enjoying an advantage over the rival when the latter enters the market and duopoly competition starts. We can summarize the foregoing discussion in the following:
Proposition 3
The leader prefers to enter with a low-quality good if the transitory monopoly power outweighs the disadvantage of being the low-quality …rm in the duopoly regime. Otherwise, the leader prefers to enter with a highquality good.
Observe that, if ¹ 2 (0;´(¹)) ; the …rst entrant produces a (limit) low quality given by (41), that keeps the follower out of the market. That is, obliging the follower to employ a larger amount of resources in the development of a higher quality turns into a sort of predatory behavior preserving the monopoly power of …rm 1.
In order to simplify the analysis, let us assume that a monopolist who starded production at t 1 and ended it at t 2 would always produce an intermediate quality with respect to the low and the high quality leader. It is easy to check that a monopolist would produce the quality level:
Our assumption amounts to saying that:
The assumption seems perfectly legitimate and ensures that, if there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with a low quality leadership, then that equilibrium implies that (i) the leader in the monopoly phase produces with quality q M = 1 8°( º ¡ 1) ; and (ii) if the follower entered with a higher quality, it would respond with the quality q 1L =
48°¹
. However, we can prove that this is not an equilibrium because the follower …nds it pro…table to enter with a low quality when the leader tries to preempt the market, correctly anticipating that o¤ering a superior quality would not pay o¤. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium is that with high quality leadership. This is proved in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4
In the absence of patent protection, a unique duopoly equilibrium exists over t 2 [t 2 ; 1); with the leader supplying the high-quality good and the follower supplying the low-quality good.
Proof. See appendix A.3.
Since entry dates are exogenous, …rms cannot in ‡uence the outcome of the game through the speed and/or intensity of their respective R&D activities. Indeed, the above Proposition reveals that the intertemporal model closely replicates the conclusions reached by previous literature dealing with static one-shot models, 8 which points out the incentive for earlier entrants to supply high-quality goods. However, the static approach usually adopted so far cannot highlight the incentive for later innovators to enter the market in the lower part of the quality spectrum. Judging on the basis of the existing literature, one is lead to believe that later entrants produce low-quality goods because they have missed the chance of doing any better. On the contrary, our model depicts a situation where pro…t incentives drive newcomers towards inferior varieties. Moreover, the static approach is by de…nition unable to account for the possibility of trading o¤ the market power attached to a dominant position in the duopoly regime against transitory monopoly power, which represents the prize for the earlier entrant. 9 We are now able to evaluate the desirability of a patent regime. Consider patent system 1. If it is adopted, the follower cannot enter the market pro…tably without infringing the leader's patent, and the leader can stay a monopolist forever by developing and patenting the limit quality (41), which can be kept asleep inde…nitely. It is then trivial to prove that it is socially preferable to allow for a duopoly equilibrium with the follower producing the low-quality product. The same considerations hold, a fortiori, for patent system 2. In the case of patent system 3, if the height of the patent is small enough (that is, " 2 [0; maxfq M ; q 1H g ¡ q 2L ]), then the patent is actually inoperative and the follower may enter the market from below. Otherwise, if " > maxfq M ; q 1H g ¡ q 2L ; entry is blockaded. This yields the following:
Proposition 5 Under convex costs of quality improvement and partial market coverage, a patent system limiting the height of later innovations in any direction is socially undesirable.
Concluding remarks
We have investigated a model of sequential entry in a market for vertically di¤erentiated goods. The foregoing discussion points out that, when quality and time are separate dimensions, …rms' strategic incentives are such that the follower will enter the market from below and gain positive pro…ts. This is also socially preferable to the alternative situation where the …rst innovator produces a limit quality and remains a monopolist. As a consequence, it appears socially undesirable to adopt a patent system so as to protect the …rst innovator.
where rc e ¡rt 2 µ 2 =°and ¹ = e ¡rt 1 : First order conditions (FOCs) w.r.t. qualities are:
In order to simplify calculations, set q L = q and q H = xq. This makes it possible to rewrite FOCs (17) and (18) in terms of q=°, to obtain:
From (17) and
From (18) . Excluding the trivial case q = 0; the syst m (19) (20) has the following solution:
10 Second order conditions are met here as well as in the next section. They are omitted for the sake of brevity.
where
The second …rst order condition could also be solved for ¹, obtaining:
and using (21)it would yield:
Since 0 · ¹ · 1, the admissible interval for x is [1:75; 5:2512].
Rearranging (6) and (7), we obtain:
In particular, R 1H can be rewritten as
Moreover, we know from Lemma 1 that the monopoly revenues accruing to the leader are everywhere increasing in the quality level, so that (3) rewrites as follows:
Hence, the overall intertemporal pro…ts of …rm 1 are: 
can be further simpli…ed as follows:
The discounted ‡ow of pro…ts accruing to the follower is:
Observe that ¦ 1H (x; º; ³) > ¦ 2L (x; ³) > 0 always.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider …rst the leader's maximum problem. Expression (10) writes as follows:
where q M = µ 2 (e ¡rt 1 ¡ e ¡rt 2 ) =(8rc) and net monopoly pro…ts over t 2 [t 1 ; t 2 ] amount to:
Firm 2's pro…t ‡ow (11) simpli…es to:
The FOC for the leader w.r.t. q L is:
Therefore, the optimal strategy for …rm 1 is given by the following best reply:
The behavior of …rm 2 is summarized by:
The equilibrium at the …rst stage can now be characterized. Plugging (37) into (38) Observe that (37) is the same best reply function identi…ed by Choi and Shin (1992) in a one-shot game where quality is costless. This coincidence is due to our assumption that decreasing quality requires no additional costs. 12 It can be veri…ed that q M > q L if t 2 > 1 r ln · e rt1 (3 + 2e rt1 ) 3¸:
If t 1 = 0; the above condition simpli…es to:
However, notice that in the opposite case, where q M < q L ; the leader could choose to develop the limit quality (41) and keep it 'asleep' until t 2 :
As a result, the discounted pro…ts accruing to the leader over the horizon [t 1 ; 1) simplify as follows:
while those of …rm 2, supplying the high-quality good, are ¦ 2H = 0:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove the proposition is su¢cient to prove that there cannot be a sub-game perfect equilibrium with a low quality leader. Suppose the opposite. Then the leader would choose the quality level q 1L =
48°¹
, which induces zero pro…ts fore the follower. However, if the follower tries to undercut the leader's quality, it gains the pro…t function
which is positive for very low q L . Hence we obtained a contradiction.
